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In the SUpreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
MARCEIJLA JENSEN TUTrLE; and 
RICHARD DALE TUTrLE, a minor, 
by his Guardian ad litem, Marcella 
Jensen Tuttle, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EX-
PRESS COMPANY, a corporation, 
and HEATH H. CORNETTE, 
Defendants and ApJ)ellants. 
NO. 7619 
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER TO REPLY BRIEF 
As the purported "Reply Brief" of apellants contains 
much argument that is repetitious, there will be some repe-
tition in the answer to such brief .. 
We feel, too, that it should be observed that the ap-
pellants' original brief was served upon respondents on or 
about the 2nd day of April, 1951, and consisted of 66 pages 
of . printed material, and the brief was filed after an ex-
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tension of time granted by this Court. to apj;>ellants of sub-
stantially more time than a month beyond the usual time 
based upon the stipulation of the parties. 
Within twenty days thereafter respondents had to re-
ply but a stipulation was secured extending the respond-
ents' time to file their brief to the 20th day of May, 1951; 
despite the stipulation, the time allowed to respondents to 
file their brief was reduced to a few days prior to May 8th, 
1951, and before such time had expired, the case was set 
for oral argument on May 8th, 1951. Within the reduced 
time, respondents filed their brief and the oase was argued 
at the time indicated. 
At the oral argument, counsel for the appellants in-
dicated that they had not had an opport:unity to prepare 
a Reply Brief and asked leave for a limited period, which 
it is recalled in the absence of a record, to have been about 
fifteen days, within which to file a Reply Brief. 
Approximately one month later, to-wit on June 6th, 
1951, respondents received a copy of an order from Hon. 
George W. Latimer, Justice of this Court, extending ap-
pellants' time to file Reply Brief to June 22nd, 1951. This 
order was made Without any communication or contact 
with counsel for respondents and without their stipulation 
or agreement. Since that time, there has been no contact 
by rthe appellants or the Court with the respondents with 
respect to any further extension, but, nevertheless, no Re-
ply Brief was served upon respondents until August 8th, 
1951, when the purported "Reply" of 44 pages of printed 
matter was received, which is in no proper sense merely 
a "Reply" but repeats largely many of the arguments in 
appellants' principal brief of 66 pages, and also advances 
in connection therewith, some new arguments and claimed 
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authorities which are not properly included in any reply. 
Thus, exactly three months after the case was orally 
argued and permission granted for appellants to file a Re-
ply Brief within fifteen days, and without any stipulation 
or agreement made as far as respondents are concerned, 
appellants filed a recapitulation and re-emphasis of 
their argument contained in the original brief, together 
with various new points advanced with a view of meeting 
comments of members of the Court during the oral argu-
ment. Respondents have been given leave to file this re-
sponse. 
FACTS O·F CASE 
The position of the appellants seems to be that if there 
are claimed eye-witnesses to an occurrence, the jury should 
be instructed to believe them as a matter of law no matter 
how confusing, misleading, absurd, impossible and unten-
able their testimony might be. According to appellants, 
their asserted eye-witnesses must be believed though it was 
physically impossible ~or the occurrence to have happened 
as they testified. They assert in substance that they must 
be believed even though the physical facts· were such that 
they could not see, as testified to by one (another disinter-
ested witness) who was with the McPhies, the claimed eye-
witnesses, whose testimony was so much relied upon by 
counsel for appellants (Tr. 422). Counsel for appellants 
assert that the Supreme Court should disregard the testi-
mony which the jury knew was true, and believe the tes-
timony of these claimed eye-witnesses, even though the 
jury had the oportuinity to observe the demeanor of the 
witnesses called by the appellants, rand to consider the ab-
surdity of their testimony and would not and could not be-
lieve them. That is the position of the appellants. 
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Counsel reiterate that the McPhie testimony is cor-
roborated by the testimony of Stevenson, Cornette and 
even Mrs. Ellis. Cornette, as it may be recalled, was the 
driver of the PIE truck involved in the collision. Steven-
son admitted that he did not see the impact (Tr. 393). He 
admitted that before driving up to the wires near the place 
where the Tuttle car and the PIE vehicle had come to rest, 
he stopped for an appreciable length of time and then drove 
slowly up to the wires (Tr. 399-400). There were other 
people he did not know who came from the east side of 
the road before the pedestrians arrived and before he got 
out or his car (Tr. 401-403).. These could have been no 
others than Holt and Beardali. Mrs. Ellis saw them also 
(Tr. 81). Cornette, the driver, had several different stories 
as to how the thing happened. One has to but read his 
testimony to see how the jury could not believe it. Upon 
cross-examination, Mrs. Ellis stated that a car that could 
have been none other than the Beardall car was on the 
east side of the road where it had been driven as testified 
to by Holt and Beardall, when the Stevenson car was 
driven up to the wires (Tr. 81-82). After all, if the· Bear-
dall car was where Mrs. Ellis saw it when the· Stevenson 
car ·was driven up as was testified to by Holt, Beardall and 
other witnesses, then Stevenson was wrong in his assump-
tions and the McPhies could not see as w.as testified to by 
the witness, Elmer Roberts. Stevenson's negative teSti-
mony that he didn't see the Beardall car there sould not 
stand against· all the other testimony that it was here. The 
fact is that because of the, physical facts, the clear and un-
equivocal testimony of the plaintiffs and all the surround-
in circumstances, the jury was convinced of the fact that 
Beardall drove his car just where he said he did and at 
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the time he said he did. He drove it to the east side of the 
road just after the impact and it was there where other 
\\itnesses saw it, at the time the Stevenson car came up 
to the wire. We do not feel that counsel should again and 
again bring this matter before the Court, both in their 
original brief and in their so-called Reply Brief. If the 
jury believed the impossible testimony of their witnesses, 
and if the physical :fjacts had corroborated their testimony, 
the result would have, of course, been different. If the 
Beardall car was on the east side of the road as believed 
by the jury and as testified to by witness after witness, 
if it \vas there as it was in fact, then, despite counsel's fran-
tic and desperate attempts to have it somewhere else, then 
Tuttle, just prior to the impact was driving north, as was 
the fact, and the verdict of the jury should stand. That 
should be sufficient. Lowder vs. Holley, Utah. __ 
233 P (2nd) 350. This should be sufficient, despite the 
impossible, untenable, absurd testimony of the claimed eye-
witnesses, who, it would appear, had spent most of the 
night after the occurrence with the driver of the truck, 
while Tuttle was fighting for his life, working out the de-
tails of an impossible story suggested by Stevenson when 
talking to the truck driver when he tried to figure out in 
his own mind what had happened to the Beardall car he 
~ad been following. At the time the details of this impos-
sible story were being worked out, Beardall and Holt, who 
knew what had happened, were helping the family and 
friends of Tuttle in his fight for life. 
On ~the other hand, the testimony of the witnesses for 
. plaintiffs was clear and convincing and in accord with the 
physical mcts and human reason. General statements 
made by counsel that the other side has engaged in state-
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ments and -conclusions calculated to confuse and distort 
will not close the eyes of the Court to the facts as shown 
by the record of the testimony in the case. 
Counsel :fior the appellants even go so {!ar ·as to say 
that the testimony of all witnesses who allegedly saw the 
collision was undisputed. Such testimony was disputed 
and proved impossible by respondents on every hand, and 
for counsel to say it was undisputed is as absurd and as far 
from the facts as is the testimony they seek to uphold. 
Counsel for appellants spend a good deal of their brief 
trying to upset the witness Holt's. testimony. Holt, it may 
be recalled, was a friend of a friend of the Tuttles. 
We will admit that Holt couldn't identify the Tuttle 
car from its lights coming from the. south. The fact was 
that after the truck had passed the Beardall car, he couldn't 
observe the lights of the Tuttle car coming from the south, 
as his vision was obstructed by the truck, which Holt said 
was crossing over past the center and on the east and left 
hand side of the road. 
It is interesting to note in connection with Holt's 
testimony that the Elliott boys who were standing some-
what north of Lou's attempting to get a ride to Springville 
testified that the truck passed them about the same time 
it was passing a car. They testified that there was at least 
one car fullowing the car the truck was passin~ (Tr. 45, 
47), and that there w~s no other car in front of the truck 
going south (Tr. 50, 51). The truck didn't honk any more 
·after it passed the Elliott boys (Tr. 51). There is little 
question but that the Beardall car was the car the truck 
was passing when it was passing the Elliott boys and that 
the Stevenson car was following. This would have given 
the northbound car seen by Holt time to reach the scene 
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of the impact where it was struck by the PIE truck. There 
is little question but that the pedestri~ans Stevenson ob-
served after the truck passed him were the Elliott boys in 
stead of the McPhies and Roberts as he had assumed. Bear-
dan was in front of Stevenson and Tuttle was coming from 
the south, and was struck on the east and left hand side of 
the road. 
We agree with the statement of ·counsel to the effect 
that the witness' testimony on direct examination is no 
stronger than as modified or limited by further examina-
tion or by cross-examination, but, of ·course, we must rea-
lize that the record of the testimony must in this case be 
read in the light most favorable to the party for whom the 
trier of facts has found, and we should take into consider-
ation all of the testimony. Lowder vs. Holley, supra. 
Looking at the testimony of the appellants, to the physi-
cal facts and to the cross-examination, it is easy to see why 
such testimony did not stand up. This testimony wtas re-
viewed in respondents' original brief and should not be re-
peated. . On the other hand, there was nothing brought 
out on cross-examination or otherwise at all inconsistent 
with the theory of respondents. 
Counsel object to the testimony of witness Charles M. 
Roberts, Douglas A. Payne, Jean Elliott, Dellis and Gordon 
Elliot that the PIE truck was going approximately 50 miles 
per hour just prior to the impact. Oounsel says that their 
testimony was only estimates as to speed. That may be so, 
but of course we have the speed recorder that fixed the 
speed of the truck at least 50 miles oo hour just prior to 
the impact (Tr. 326), and Stevenson said that the truck 
was going between 50 and 55 miles per hour at that time 
(Tr. 408). Hbw can counsel object to rthis testimony? 
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The testimony of these witnesses is fairly summarized on 
pages 6 and 7 of respondents' original brief and the general 
reference by counsel as to the negative chavacter of such 
damaging testimony should not mi:slead anyone. Counsel 
talk about friendly witnesses. Charles M. Rloberts, Doug-
las A. Payne, Jean Elliott, Gordon Elliott, Dellis Elliott, 
Carol Ellis, Ernest L. Holt, and in fact all witnesses of the 
plaintiff, except Beardall and Mr. and Mrs. Tuttle's family 
were unacquainted with the deceased and his family prior 
to the decedent's death. What is this talk about friendly 
witnesses? Of course, they were friendly in that they tes-
tified as to what they saw and as to the facts, which fa~ 
were corroborated by physical evidence on every hand. 
All through their brief, appellants snatch bits of tes-
timony from the record, but even that does not appear 
damaging at all to the respondents' theory and case. They 
quote from the testimony of Douglas A. Payne and say 
that he did not see the truck after 1 Y2 or 2 blocks after 
it passed him but they did not refer to his testimony that 
it went away in a whirl of snow, nor did they mention its 
terrific speed to which he testified. 
Of course, the Elliott boys would not remember all the 
cars that passed them in a course of ten minutes, but they 
did remember particularly the PIE truck because it was 
far out of line. The fragments of testimony of the Elliott 
boys snatched by counsel from the record should avail 
them nothing. The testimony of Gordon that he turned his 
back to the truck as it came on seemed to worry counsel. 
They would have us believe that Gordon Elliott testified 
that as the truck came from the north throwing up a lot 
of wind and snow that he turned his face to the north. 
The wind and snow would be coming from the north, and, 
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of course, he turned to the south as he testified (Tr. 57, 
66) and watched the truck as he testified, and as set out 
in the Reply Brief of appellants on pages 10 and 11. The 
testimony of the boys, however, was clear and unequivocal 
that there was no other car south of the one that the truck 
was passing when it was passing them; and the car which 
the truck was passing at the time could be no other than 
the Beardall car. Stevenson testified that the PIE driver 
continued to honk the horn until after the truck passed 
him. The Elliott boys testified that after the truck passed 
the car almost directly opposite them the truck quit honk-
ing (Tr. 46). There is no question that the Stevenson car 
was behind the Beardall car, and when the truck passed 
the Beardall car it quit honking and began sliding across 
the road because it went out of control and then struck the 
Tuttle car on the east side of the road. 
It is interesting to note that the appellants did not call 
the Elliott boys at the first trial although their investigator 
took a statement from Gordon shortly after the accident 
(Tr. 70). The statement of Gordon Elliott quoted on pages 
11 and 12 of the original brief of appellants is not inconsis-
tent with the testimony and the theory of respondents. 
This statement was written by the investigator for the ap-
pellants in his own handwriting, and as Gordon stated upon 
his examination, did not contain other matters he told to 
the investigator which would have been more damaging to 
appellants' case. Even in that statement, the investigator 
could not get Gordon to say that the collision involved a 
southbound car. It is interesting to note further in the 
. statement that the truck at about the time it went past 
Gordon Elliott, was passing some other cars, not one car, 
. but cars; and there is no question but what it passed both 
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the Stevenson car and the Beardall car, and that the Bear-
dan car, at the time it was passed, was further south than 
the Stevenson car. The words put into the mouth of the 
young boy by the investigator still would not avail the ap-
pellants. 
There was nothing brought out on cross-examination 
or in any other testimony of the witnesses, Holt, Beardall 
and Ellis that established anything other than the fact that 
the Beardall ear was the one that the truck passed after 
it passed the Stevenson- car and that it was the one that 
Stevenson mistakingly believed may have been the Tuttle 
car. 
Counsel argue that hearsay evidence is not competent 
evidence, and object to the testimony of Mrs. Ellis as to 
when she -changed her mind as to the direction the ·Tuttle 
car was traveling. She testified that she had so changed 
her mind when Stevenson told her thy had been mistaken. 
This testimnoy merely established a point of time. She 
could not account for the car which she saw on the east 
when the Stevenson car first arrived at the scene (Tr. 82) 
(Tr. 97). She was very frank in her first impression that 
the Stevenson car had been following the Tuttle car, but 
when she learned that they had been following the Beardall 
car instead of the Tuttle ear, she could account for the car 
being on the east side of the road which she observed when 
she first arrived at the scene. This, among other reasons, 
she testified, was why she changed her mind from her· first 
mistaken impression which was seized upon by the driver 
and the investigator (Tr. 97). Mrs Ellis also testified that 
she told the investigator information such as the speed of 
the truck, etc. which he left out of the statement which she 
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gave him, testimony which would have been damaging to 
the appellants' case. 
Dispute as to the Beardall car. 
Counsel for the appellants try to confuse the matter 
as to whether the Bearoall or Stevenson ·car arrived first. 
In order that the Court will not be misled by the parts of 
the testimony of the witnesses, we quote in full the testi-
mony of Beardall, the driver of the car, and Holt, his pas-
senger, with respect to the wire: 
Direct examination of Clifford Beardall: 
"Naw will you state, Mr. Beardall, just what hap-
pened as the truck passed, if anything, or after the 
truck passed? 
A. Well, as the truck passed me it was only a 
few seconds or some time until ·we heard a collision, 
terrific impact and a light flash from the poles, and 
Mr. Holt spoke to me and. said, 'Look at the light up 
there.', and I said, 'Yes, look at the car across the 
road.', and as I glanced at the car he said, 'Stop the 
car. The wires are in front of you.', and as I pulled 
my car to a stop the wires was aboUt eight inches 
from my car. 
Q. All right. Was there any ·car at all in front 
of you? 
A. I never seen a car in front of me, no sir. 
Q. And what did you do then, Mr. Beardall? 
A. I immediately opened my left hand door and 
looked around to see if there was any traffic following 
me, and turned my car in a diagoruil position across 
the highway and on to the east side of the road and 
pulled my lights up until they hit the scene of the ac-
cident.'' 
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Cross-examination of Cliffo;rd Beardall: 
''Were the wires coming over the-laying up against 
semitrailer of the truck? 
A. No. I think the semi had gone past them. 
Probably hit them at one time or another but gone by. 
The pole on the west side was still up. 
Q. . But the wires had come to rest, or were down 
when you got there were they not? 
A. Still moving, yes. 
Q. Still moving which way, Mr. Beardall? 
A. How would any wire knocked down be mov-
ing? 
Q. If there was any current in the wires they 
would be moving around I guess, wouldn't they? 
A. That's right. 
Q. What I had reference to was the wires were 
not falling at the time you got there? 
A. No. No, they were at their destination, I 
think.'' 
Direct examination Qf Ernest L. Holt: 
"A.. Ordinarily when a truck passes you it stays 
in the lane to the right of the center line,or gets into 
the lane farthest to the right. In this case the truck 
went over into the other inside lane of the northbound 
traffic. 
Q. And then just state what happened. 
A. Well, the next thing we saw was a flash of 
light caused by the utility pole being broken off, and 
I saw this line fall across the highway and I called 
Mr. Beardall's attention to hurry and stop the car be-
fore he hit it. 
Q. And then what was done? 
A. We stopped about a foot away from the line 
and we immediately, Mr. Beardall I should say, im-
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mediately backed the car across the highway so that 
the lights would. be directed on the car that was sitting 
off to the side of the highway. 
Q. All right. Now when you got up to the wires, 
were there any other cars? 
A. There were no other cars there. 
Q. And then what did you do? 
A. We had a railroad lantern in the back of the 
car. I grabbed that and got out of the car and tried 
to stop the cars that were coming so they wouldn't run 
into the car. 
Q. Then what happened? 
A. Well someone, after we got the cars that were 
coming to a stop, someone raised this wire to let the 
cars go by, and someone else come along and took the 
wire off the -pole and threw it to the other side of the 
highway.'' 
No cross-examination of Ernest L. Holt with respect to this. 
We must also remember the testimony of Mrs. Ellis 
that there was a car at the scene to the east side when she 
arrived in the Stevenson car, where it had been driven as 
Holt and Beardall testified (Tr. 81-82) (Tr. 97). Steven-
son also testified that before he drove up to the wire he 
had stopped his car some distance to the north. and then 
proceeded slowly up to the wire (Tr. 399). Payne also 
t~fied that when he drove up to the scene he parked on 
the east side behind a car that could have been no other 
than the Beardall car (Tr. 37). Beardall stopped his car 
within a few inches of the wires as they fell down (Tr. 137). 
S~venson's car was not there then. Elmer ROberts, who 
was one of the pedestrians with the McPhies came up to 
the scene after the Stevenson ·car arrived and was parked 
in ~ront of the wire. Roberts saw Beardall standing in the 
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middle of the road as soon as he arrived (Tr. 423). There 
is the inescapable conclusion that Beardall and Holt were at 
the scene first. It is interesting to note that the street 
lights on the east had gone out at the impact but there were 
lights showin~ on the Tuttle car when Roberts arrived. 
These lights eould have been from no other place but the 
Beardall car. Roberts arrived at the scene before the 
McPhies. The fact is that the Beardall car was the car 
Stevenson mistakingly thought was the Tuttle car and that 
is what the jury believed, and there is ample evidence to 
support the findings of the jury. Beardall testified that 
he heard the impact (Tr. 113). 
Counsel for appellants further make the statement 
tl.lat McPhies were allegedly standing right by the point 
where the collision occurred. Of course, this is not the 
fact, and even if the testimony of the McPhies is to be ~ 
lieved they were standing at a point approximately 600 feet 
north of the point of impact. But even at that, according 
to Roberts, who was with the McPhies, it was impossible 
to see because of the snow being thrown up by the truck 
(Tr. 422). The testimony of Carol Ellis does not cor-
roborate that of the McPhies, as ·contended by counsel for 
appellants. 
On page 16 of their brief, counsel have had one of the 
exhibits printed, being a photograph of the highway taken 
sometime after the collision. It is in the brief apparently 
to give a distorted picture of the width of the part of the 
road covered by snow. An e~rt called by the respond-
ents stated that the picture was distorted because it was 
taken from the center of the road and would make the 
snowy portion appear much wider than was the fact (Tr. 
451.) Even in looking at the picture some distance down 
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the road one can see that the darker portions and the cen-
ter portions are more nearly the same width. The other 
exhibits should be observed in order to show the true pic-
ture. We call particular attention to defendants' exhibit 
12. We should remember here in determining whether or 
not the PIE truck was over to the east or wrong side of 
the road that the paved or hard surface of the highway 
was 40 feet (Tr. 19-21) .. Each marked lane of traffic was 
10 feet. Stevenson, one of appellants' witnesses, testified 
that he drove his car down the darkened portion of the 
road that can be seen on the right side of the photo which 
appears on page 16 of appellants' brief. Stevenson testi-
fied that the center of the dark portion would be at about 
the line dividing the two southbound lanes of traffic (Tr. 
388). That was the portion upon which he was traveling. 
That was also the testimony of officer Paul S. Anderson who 
came to the scene of the occurrence (Tr. 165). This would 
mean that the Stevenson car, in driving south, would be 
approximately 2:Y2 feet on the inside lane of the south-
bound traffic. The truck, according to the driver's testi-
mony, was 8 feet wide (Tr. 268). When the truck pas·sed 
Stevenson, there could only be 7:Y2 feet available for the 
truck on the southbound portion of the road if there were 
no distance at all between the truck and the Stevenson car 
when the truck passed. Standing side by side with the 
Stevenson ·car without any space between, the truck would 
have been over beyond the center of the highway at least 
one-half foot. He would have had to have some room to 
pass, as according to Mrs. Ellis the trailer swerved all 
around them when it passed them (Tr. 86). They gave it 
plenty of room (Tr. 86). Stevenson's. car traveled in same 
lane (Tr. 80, Tr. 275 and Tr. 388), according to Mrs. Ellis, 
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Cornette, the driver, and Stevenson, and so it is inescapable 
that at all times in the vicinity of the -collision the truck 
was over the center of the highway as much as several 
feet. Beardall ·testified that he was driving in the dark 
portion of the highway, and Cornette testified that both 
the Stevenson car and the car he thought was the Tuttle 
car was driving in the dark portion of the highway (Tr. 
275) . Holt testified that while they were driving in the 
dark portion of the highway and at the time the truck 
passed them it went way on the east side of the highway, 
and Gordon Elliott testified that when the truck went 
around a turn of the road it cut across the turn more to 
the east side of the highway. The speculation of the Mc-
Phies and others that the truck was on the west and cor-
rect side of the highway falls upon the testimony of Ste-
venson, Officer Anderson, and other witnesses, and even 
upon the testimony of the driver Cornette, which testi-
mony again shows it was physically impossible because 
of the width of the truck to hq.ve had its east wheels west 
of the center part of the highway, and in fact, according 
to Holt, it was way over to the east or wrong side of the 
highway· at the time of the impact (Tr. 137). 
Physical Facts 
On page 20 of their Reply Brief, counsel for appel-
lants have inserted copies of the photos, defendants' exhi-
bits 3, 4 and 9. On page 7 of their original brief, they 
have shown the plat of the scene of the impa-ct, plaintiffs' 
exhibit "GG". On the plat of the scene of the impact the 
driver Cornette has drawn on the west part of the four-
lane highway his version of the occurrence. The truck is 
marked with a figure "2" and the ~car he claimed was the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
Tuttle. car is marked with a "1". It may be noted that in 
his diagram he claimed the Tuttle car at the time of the 
impact was facing to the southeast and that the truck 
first struck the car from the left side of the rear at the 
time the Tuttle car allegedly turned in front of the truck. 
The driver testified that the right hand side of the bumper 
of his truck first struck the car "Kind of diagonal" (Tr. 
263). If this were so, the force would be from the rear 
to the front of the Tuttle car. However, if we look at the 
defendants' exhibits which appear on page 20 of appellants' 
Reply Brief and particularly. at the first two that appear 
on ~e top of. the page, we may note that the force was 
from the front to the back of the Plymouth automobile. 
This \Vould be entirely in conformance with the theory of 
the respondents that Tuttle was traveling north and turned 
to the right to avoid the PIE truck which went out of con-
trol over to the east side of the road. 
Counsel on page 21 of their Reply Brief try to explain 
how the Plymouth· automobile could end up east and quite 
a distance north of the point the PIE truck came to rest 
on the east side of the highway. We must remember that 
the PIE outfit, weighing between sixty and sixty-four 
thousand pounds, was going south at a rate of almost fifty-
two miles per hour. If the Plymouth auto, weighing un-
der two tons, turned in front of the PIE truck as appel-
lants assert, it would have been thrown way down the high-
way in front of the PIE truck, and would have been way 
to the south. If it had happened as Cornette represents 
on his diagram appearing on page 7 of the original brief of 
appellants, it would have been thrown way to the west and 
south of appellants' truck. Counsel assert that the mo-
mentum from the truck would have ·carried it further than 
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the Plymouth auto. We must not forget, however, that 
the momentum of the truck struck the Plymouth auto as 
the auto showed evidence of the tremendous impact. It 
is unthinkable that if the car turned at an angle in front 
of the truck as testified to by the McPhies, going little 
more than five miles per hour, that it could have made the 
big truck, going more than fifty miles per hour, and weigh-
ing more than thirty times the weight of the Plymouth, 
turn to the east, and then have the car end up further to 
the north and east than such PIE truck (Tr. 263, 368). 
The theory is incredible. No wonder the jury could not 
believe it. 
On the other hand, the physi-cal facts show that the 
PIE truck· was over on the east side of the highway, cut-
ting across the curve, flashing its lights on and off and 
Tuttle, approaching from the_ south, turned to the right 
to avoid the impact and was struck somewhat from the 
front as the photos show on page 20 of appellants' brief. 
The truck jacknifed and the momentum of the car car-
ried it north and east of the truck. There is no question 
but that those are the simple, inescapable facts. 
Counsel, as did Cornette in his diagram on page 7 of 
apellants' original brief, assumed that the first point of im-
pact with the Plymouth was toward the rear of such car, 
the force then would have been from re·ar to front, but 
the photos on page 20 of appellants' Reply Brief show and 
demonstrate that the force was from front to back, and 
as may be seen from their own exhibits their theory will 
not hold water. 
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Time of Accident 
Many witnesses for the respondents set the time of 
the departure of Dal~ Tuttle from Springville (Tr. 145, 
154, 177, 183, 189). That was the testimony believed by 
the jury, the arguments of counsel for appellants were all 
advanced in their argument before the jury. The testi-
mony of all the witnesses as to the time of the departure 
of Dale Tuttle, their opportunity to observe and reasons 
for observation was all clear and convincing. It would cer-
tainly appear unnecessary to reiterate and go over this 
testimony, time and time again. The fact is that appel-
lants could not and cannot now explain the time element. 
Respondents' Authorities 
The objection that counsel have to the authorities is 
mainly premised upon their belief that the jury had to be-
lieve their purported eye-witnesses which they did not and 
could not believe because of the impossibility of their tes-
timony. If they believed that they were not telling the 
truth, which is the inescapable conclusion, then there 
were no eye-witnesses to the occurrence. We agree in the 
main to the general principles stated by the appellants that 
the cases should be decided upon the facts, and that the 
cases should not be decided upon mere speculation. We 
do not believe that testimony of alleged eye-witnesses 
whose testimony is impossible and contrary to the physi-
cal facts is entitled to any credence. It is in fact no tes-
timony at all. Counsel argue that the holding in the case 
of Perrin v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 P. 405 
militates against respondents' position. In that case there 
was a question of the contributory negligence. of decedent 
and it was there stated that in the absence· of evidence 
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there was a presumption that decedent was using due care. 
In the instant case, the jury did not believe the testimony 
of the witnesses for appellant, they did not believe that the 
decedent was traveling south at the time of the impact. 
There was no evidence as to his conduct in driving north 
toward Provo, and the Court's Instruction No. 6 that "In 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is a pre-
sumption that the deceased used due car for his own pro--
tection," was properly before the jury. Ryan v. Union 
Pac. R. R. Co.; 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 71. Duhren et al v. 
Stewart, 39 c·A 2nd 201, 102 P. 2nd 784. 
The cases referred to by respondents on pages 15 and 
16 of their original brief support their theory. The physi-
cal facts do not corroborate any testimony of the appel-
lants but on the contrary entirely corroborate the evidence 
of respondents. Respondents' evidence is direct and posi-
tive, and contrary to appellants' contention is not nega-
tive. The facts which the respondents' evidence show, 
could result in no verdict other than the verdict as given 
by the jury. 
Defendants' motion for a directed verdict was properly 
denied. 
We cannot see the necessity of rehashing the Court's 
action in denying defendants' motion for a directed ver-
dict. Appellants' and defendants' contentions were treated 
in detail in respondents' brief pages 12 to 20 inclusive. Ap-
pellants inje-ct nothing new in support of their contention 
in their so-called "Reply Brief." Their assertions are fully 
answered in respondents' original brief. They still reiter-
ate that the jury was by law required to believe the t~ti­
mony of their so-called eye-witnesses, whose testimony was 
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strictly at variance with physical possibility, and was ab-
surd, far-fetched and contrary to the facts. That is their 
main contention to support their motion for a directed ver-
dict. The positive, clear and convincing testimony of re-
spondents in accordance with the physical facts and hu-
man reason was believed by the jury. There could have 
been no other decision. 
Appellants' reference to instructions. 
There is no question but that the Court submitted to the 
jury in fair and impartial language the controlling ques-
tion as to the direction of travel of decedent, just prior to his 
death. There is no question but that the jury decided that 
the decedent was traveling north. Appellants' objections 
to the instructions were also treated fully on pages 20 to 
32 of respondents' original brief. Appellants' so .. called re-
ply is merely a reh~h and reiteration. There is nothing 
new in their arguments in this connection. 
Determination by jury of direction of travel. 
The argument of counsel that the jury did not deter-
mine that the Tuttle car was traveling north is brought to 
an interesting light in referring to appellants' Exceptions 
to the Instructions of the Court. We call the Court's at-
tention to the language of counsel in their exception to 
instruction No. 5 of the Court (Tr. 462): 
"Excepts to the Court's Instruction No. 5 and 
to the whole thereof, for the reason that the Instruc-
tion is not justified under the evidence in that it makes 
the sole issue in the case whether the deceased's car 
was going northbound or southbound, and eliminates 
the question of contributory negligence if deceased was 
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going northbound. Also, that there is probative evi-
dence that deceased was northbound." 
Again in their brief the counsel for appellants gather 
portions of instructions in a hope of getting a misleading 
interpretation. Both in their opening statement to the 
jury and in their argument to the jury, eounsel for the ap-
pellants stated that the sole question was the direction of 
travel of the deceased. Counsel for respondents concurred 
in that statement. The instructions of the c·ourt made this 
issue clear and correctly stated the law. In an effort to 
confuse, the appellants quote part of the material instruc-
tions, and although the instructions 3 and 4 were quoted 
in respondents' original brief on pages 25 and 26, we again 
quote them in full with instruction No. 5 to again empha-
size to the Court the clear picture and questions given by 
the instructions and to show how unfair counsel for appel-
lants are attempting to be. The instructions follow: 
"No. 3. You are instrueted that plaintiff's con-
tention is that at the time of the accident, the deceased, 
Dale Tuttle, was driving an automobile north on the 
highway at the time and place of the accident, and 
that the defendant, Heath H. Cornette, was driving 
defendants' truck south upon said highway in the op-
posite direction, and that plaintiffs further claim that 
the defendant Cornette carelessly and negligently 
turned and drove defendants' truck across the center 
line, and thereby proximately causing the collision. 
''If you find by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendants were negligent as elaimed by the 
plaintiffs, the accident having occurred as claimed by 
the plaintiffs and that such negligence of the defend-
ants, if any, was the proximate cause of the death of 
Dale Tuttle, and if you further find from the evidence 
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that the said Dale Tuttle exercised reasonable care for 
his own safety and was not himself guilty of negli- · 
gence contributing to his death, then you are instruc-
ted that it will be your duty to return a verdit in fa-
vor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in this 
action for damages to be fixed and ·assessed by you 
in aet.--ordance with instructions as herein given. 
"No. 4. You are instructed that the defendants 
claim in their pleadings herein that at the time of the 
accident that both cars or vehicles involved in this 
accident were traveling south, the Tuttle car being in 
the west lane or shoulder, and defendants' truck be ... 
ing in the lane next west to the center line, and that 
just as defendants' truck was going to overtake and 
pass the car driven by Mr. Tuttle, Mr. Tuttle sudden-
ly made a left turn in front of the defendants' truck, 
causing the collision. 
"You are further instructed that if you find from 
the evidence that both drivers were in fact traveling 
south and that the deceased, Dale Tuttle, was negligent 
in suddenly turn~g in front of defenda~ts' t~ck apd 
that such negligence proximately contributed to cause 
the collision, then plaintiffs cannot recover and your 
verdict must be in favor of the defendants against the 
plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
"No. 5. The fact that I have instructed you on 
the law applied to the conflicting contentions of the 
parties should not be taken by you as an indication 
the court believes that the ~efendant was going either 
southbound or northbound, but are given to enable 
yo~ to decide the case under the law, according tn 
whether you feel the deceased was southbound or 
northbound." (Emphasis ours .. ) 
How can counsel be serious? The jury. had to deter-
mine the direction of travel of decedent in order· to decide, 
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and there is no question but that they determined that he 
was going north. There was no question in· counsel's minds 
at the time their exceptions were taken after the submission 
of the case to the jury that the instructions of the Court 
were such that the case should be decided upon the ques-
tion as they had stated in their opening statement and ar-
gument before the jury, that if the deceased, prior to the 
impact, was going north there should be recovery, and if 
going south there should be no recovery. Appellants at-
. tempt now to confuse the whole matter by quoting por-
tions of instructions which do not give the true picture. 
Defendants' theory of the evidence submitted to jury. 
Again counsel wants to rehash the issues. There is 
no question but what appellants' theory was clearly sub-
mitted to the jury and upon their opening statement, their 
theory was that the decedent was traveling south just be-
·fore the impact~ The defendants' requests which the ap-
pellantS argue should have been given were merely repe-
titious. and, in most cases, were biased and argumentative 
reiter~~ions of the single theory of the defendants, that the 
deceased was going south.· The ultimate question of direc-
tion of travel of the deceased was properly submitted to 
the jury. . In examining defendants' requests for instruc-
tions and particularly Nos. 5, 8, 9, 10, and 11 referred to 
on page 31 ·of their Reply Brief, we fail to find anything 
that should have been submitted to the jury under proper 
instructions, that was not submitted. :Counsel makes the 
·broad, general statement that because of· the failure of 
the Court to give their requests, there was prejudicial er-
ror, even- though the material substance of their requests 
. was given,. without repetition as was desired by the appel-
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lants. The issues of direction of travel of deceased, and 
of contributory negligence were placed squarely before the 
jury in instructions No. 3 (J.R. 223) and No. 4 (J.R. 224) 
and No. 5 (J.R. 225), and we feel that it would have been 
error for the Court to give repetitious emphasis to the de-
fendants' theory as requested. An instruction on their 
theory was requested in appellants' request No.4 (J.R. 201). 
and their theory was presented to the jury by the Court. 
There were no "errors or procedure" calculated to do harm, 
as claimed by appellants. 
ill course, as appellants assume, there was no ack-
nowledgment of errors in this case in the Court's instruc-
tions. The respondents' only acknowledgment rests in 
their statement, that even if we assume the appellants 
were correct in their contention that there was error, then 
there should be no ground for reversal because such errors 
as the appellants assumed were committed were not preju-
dicial. Counsel for appellants again refer to the case of 
Jensen v. Utah Ry. Company, 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349. 
They refer in their brief to the statement made in such 
case that where there are errors calculated to do harm, 
they would be presumed to be prejudicial unless it is shown 
that they are not. The Jensen case was referred to in re-
spondents' brief, 31 and 32. 
In the instant case, we have demonstrated time after 
time that any error, claimed or assumed, by the appellants 
was not only not calculated to do harm, but could not have 
been in any way prejudicial. Whichever view the jury 
took on direction, determined the outcome. In fact ap-
]>ellants do not even contend that if the deceased just prior 
to the impact was traveling north, that they would not be 
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liable. The case of Thelin v. Stewart; 100 Cal. 312, 34 P. 
701, cited by .appellants further supports the respondents' 
view in this connection. From that case, the following is 
quoted from page 704: 
"We think this but an admonition that errors, or 
defects, shall not be presurhed prejudicial, to have re-
sulted in miscarriage of justice and thus that harmful 
results are not to be presumed from, nor reversals 
granted, for mere error. In the language of the stat-
ute, the court, before it is warranted in reversing a 
judgment, 'must be satisfied' that a committed error 
resulted in prejudice of some substantial right. But 
how satisfied? Not by a presumption from mere er-
ror, but by something showing such prejudicial effect. 
How may that be shown? Some committed errors, 
prima facie, are not calculated to do harm. Hence no 
presumption of harmful effect is to be indulged. 
Nevertheless, the party against whom such errors are 
made may, by the record, demonstrate, if he can, that 
the rulings did resul.t to his prejudice of some sub-
stantial right. On the other hand, error may be com-
mitted which, prima facie, is calculated to do harm 
and to affect substantial rights. From such error 
prejudice and harmful effect of such rights will be pre-
sumed until, by the record, it is demonstrated that the 
error did not have, or could not have had, such preju-
dicial or harmful effect; and, if not so demonstrated, 
then, ought the court to be satisfied that prejudice re-
sulted." 
In the instant case, we submit that there was not even 
error calculated to do hann, but have gone further than 
our burden should be and have demonstrated from the rec-
ord that there ·could have, in fact, been no prejudice. The 
jury decided the ultimate fact in favor of the respondents 
and the appellants should not now be allowed to complain 
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because they were instrumental i:n submitting such ij}ti-
mate fact to the jury in their requests, in their argwnent· 
to the jury, and in their opening statement, the ultimate 
fact of direction of travel of deceased. 
The case of Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co!', 
73 Utah 486, 275 P. 582, treats mainly with the presump-
tion of due care in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
and the holding in that case would support the Court's 
instruction that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
there would be a presumption that the deceased used due 
care. Nothing in that case would support the appellants' 
contention of any precedure or error calculated to do hann. 
The other authorities cited add nothing more to their con-
tention. 
There was no "procedure" in this case calculated to preju-
dice, as claimed by appellants in their Reply Brief. 
We hesitate to repeat in any way the substance of our 
original brief, but in view of the fact that the appellan~' 
so-called Reply Brief appears to ·be merely a repetition of 
their original brief, some repetition on our part is inevi-
table.. Appellants again refer to the Court's instruction 
No. 1. The instruction as we have stated merely recited 
the various allegations of the parties and clearly stated 
that such allegations were denied by the opposing parties. 
There were no allegations recited concerning the conduct 
of the defendants upon which there was not ample evi:-
dence. The instruction also recited the elaims of the de-
fendants as to the conduct of the deceased, some claims 
upon which there was not any evidence introduced. There 
could be and was no argument but what speed was a con-
. tributing factor in the death of the deceased, as there was 
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a·mple evidence that the PIE truck went out of control be-
fore any impact (Tr. 389-390). If the jury had believed 
that the deceased was traveling south prior to the impact, 
then speed may not have contributed to the death of de. 
ceased, because if that had been so, under the instructions 
to the jury, plaintiffs could not recover; but the jury did 
. not believe the contentions of the defendants, and could 
well have found upon the evidence ·and ~nstructions that 
speed was a major contributing factor . 
. There was no error "calculated to prejudice," as cia~. 
All of the cases cited by appellants in objection to the 
Court's instruction No. 15 concerned 'situations where the 
giving of such instruction would be prejudicial. None of 
such cases are from this jurisdiction except Saltas v. Aff-
leck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176, where such an instruction 
was not considered as prejudicial error, as the case was 
reversed on other grounds. 
Where, as in this case, the appellants have emphasized 
that the control~ing question was the direction of deceased's 
travel, whether north or south, and that question has been 
submitted to the jury; then assuming, as we ·do not, that 
the Court's instruction as to speed was erroneous, it would 
not be prejudicial because if the jury had decided that. the 
deceased was not traveling north at the impact, there could 
have been no verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs. The 
jury was instructed in effect that if the decedent was trav-
eling south and turned in front of the defendants' truck 
as alleged by the defendants there could be no recove~. 
We have demonstrated throughout our arguments and 
·brief time after tim-e that instruction No. 15, assuming 
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that the defendants are correct in their assertions, could 
not have been prejudicial. 
Counsel again reierates their objection to the Court's 
instruction No. 14, and we say again that in instruction 
No. 14, no greater burden was placed upon the defendants 
than was proper. The Court's instruction is quoted as fol-
lows: 
"You are instructed that in addition to the duty 
to keep a proper lookout, a driver must at all times 
maintain such control over his automobile and must 
take such measures as are reasonable to stop or turn 
to avoid a collision with another vehicle or person upon 
the highway reasonably within range of his vision. 
And in the event such driver fails or neglects to so 
keep his vehicle under control as set forth above, he 
is negligent. And where such negligence proximately 
causes injury or damage to any other person or prop-
erty, the driver of such vehicle is liable for all result-
ing damage, unless such person is himself guilty of 
negligence which proximately contributes to produce 
the injury .. '' 
The cases Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah 261, 170 P. 72; 
State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177; treat with con-
flicting instructions and it could not be determined whether 
the jury was following the correct or incoiTect instruction 
in reaching their verdict. That is very much different 
than here where the material matter they were to deter-
mine was the direction of travel of deceased. The ·case of 
Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478, 189 P.2d 127, held that 
where the Court failed to advise the jury as to the effect 
of alleged negligence on the part of plaintiff, should it find 
that such negligence proximately contributed to her own 
injuries, it was prejudicial error. 
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No error in Court's instruction No. 13. 
Again the appellants quote a part of an instruction in 
order to give an unfair and biased picture. It may be noted 
that the Court instructs the jury that it is the duty of a 
driver of a motor vehicle upon the public highways in the 
state to at all times exercise due care and diligence in or-
der to prevent injury to persons or property lawfully upon 
the highway. In order to give a clear picture of the in-
struction, we quote it: 
"You are instructed that it is the duty of a driver 
of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this 
State to at all times exercise due care and diligence 
in order to prevent injury to persons or property law-
fully upon the highway. Included in this duty to use 
due care and diligence is the duty to constantly keep a 
lookout not only ahead, but to the sides of his vehicle, 
and to actually see, as well as look for, all persons, ob-
jects and things which are reasonably within the range 
of his vision, arid which may constitute a hazard. It 
is then his further duty after having seen, or after he 
should have seen, to use such care and diligence as a 
reasonable and prudent person, having due regard to 
all conditions of the highway, the presence of inter-
sections, obstructions or any other condition which 
may produce a hazard, would use to prevent injury. 
And in the event that a driver fails or neglects at any 
time to exercise such reasonable care and diligence, 
he is negligent. And if, as a proximate result of such 
negligence, injury or damage is caused to any person, 
the driver so causing the injury or damage is liable 
to the person thus injured for all damages sustained 
by reason of such negligence, unless such person is 
himself negligent and his negligence proximately con-
tributes to produce the injury. 
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''Thus, if you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence in this case that the defendant, while oper-
ating his truck-trailer, failed to use the degree of care 
and caution as set forth above, and that as a direct and 
proximate result thereof Dale Tuttle was killed, your 
verdict should be in favor of the plaintiffs, unless you 
also fmd that the deceased, Dale Tuttle, was also n~g­
ligent in some respect and such negligence proximately 
contributed to produce the accident with its conse-
quent death of deceased." 
In looking at the instruction as a whole, it may be 
observed that the Court did not impose an absolute duty 
and it is not a fact that it imposed liability upon the de-
fendants if the driver did not "constantly keep a lookout 
not only ahead but to the sides of his vehicle", as in con-
sidering the instruction as a whole, there could be no pre-
judice to the defendants, for if the jury found that the de-
ceased was going south, it was instructed in find in effect 
.. for the defendants, and if he were going north, the instruc-
tion was wholly immaterial as the truck would be on the 
wrong side of the road. Even in the case of Morrison v. 
Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772, cited by appellants in 
their original and reply briefs, the Court holds that under 
some circumstances there would be required a constant 
lookout. The Court as stated in our original brief, in view 
of the dangerous conditions of the road, as brought out 
by the evidence, could well instruct as a matter of law 
that there was required a constant lookout in the ins~t 
case, but the Court qualified his instruction more ~ favor 
of the appellants. 
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Submitting all allegations. 
For the reasons stated on pages 21, 22, and 28 of re-
spondents 'original brief, there was no error in submitting 
all allegations. A;ppellants add nothing to . their original 
arguments in their Reply Brief, excepting that they allude 
to the number of requests of respondents apparently in 
connection with the Supreme Court's ·comments in the oral 
argument. The fact is that there was substantial evidence 
in the record to show negligence on the part of the defend-
ants in every way alleged in the complaint, and that such 
negligence· contributed to the death of the deceased, and 
was the proximate cause thereof. 
Refenences as to speed, etc. 
The main objection apparently made by appellants 
seems to be that there were too many requests which re-
ferred to the speed of truck and other matters, whether 
or not the requests were given by the Court. They do not 
contend that speed was not a contributing factor and that 
it was not proved at the trial of the case. 
Re.:£erenoo to lights. 
True it may be that reference to the lights of the truck 
in the instructionss would not he proper if the jury believed 
the fiction that prior to the death of the deceased he was 
~raveling south. On the other hand it was proper to sub-
mit the matter to the jury because lights flashing on and 
off bright beam could well confuse and blind oncoming traf-
fic. Further reference to this seems unnecessary as it has 
been covered in both the appellants' brief and the re·spond-
ents' brief. 
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Referenc~ as to presumption. 
Again we say in answer to appellants' reassertion, that 
there was no error in the Court's Instruction No. 6, and 
the Court, 1n accordance with the rule stated in the case 
of Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 73 Utah 486, 
275 P. 582, correctly instructed the jury that in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary there would be a pre--
sumption that the deceased exercised due care for his own 
safety. The jury believed under the instructions of the 
Court that the deceased was proceeding north jus.t prior 
to the impact, and there was no evidence as to any con-
tributory negligence on his part at all. The theory was 
presented to the Court in plaintiff's requests Nos. 12 (J.R. 
161) and 13 (J.R. 162). 
Appellants' requested instruction No. 19 (J.R. 216) 
assumed that the jury must believe the alleged eye-witnes-
ses against all reason and physical evidence and that the 
Court should so instruct the jury. Their request was made 
only upon their theory of the case based upon the fiction 
that the deceased was traveling south. It would ·have ben 
improper and error to give such request as an instruction 
and the Court properly declined to give it. The· instruc-
tion of the Court was correct. Ryan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 
46 Utah 530, 151 P. 71. See also Duehren et al v. Stew-
art, 39 C. A. 2d, 102 P.2d 784. 
There was no over-emphasis as to. inferences and presump-
tions. 
Counsel's general statements as to the Court's instruc-
tion No. 9 should avail nothing. Counsel fails to and can-
not point how such instruction is erroneous. The Court's 
instruction No. 9, we submit, was correct. 
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Sud<len emergency. 
Instruction No. 22 (J.R. 2443) had as much applica-
tion to the ·case on defendants' theory as well as plaintiffs' 
theory. If the defendants' theory had been believed by 
the jury, they might have thought that the driver of the 
PIE truck could have done something to avoid the acci-
dent, but under the instruction of the Court would not 
have held the defendants responsible because the driver 
failed to choose the wiser of two courses. Respondents' 
requests were not in any way in the abstract, but related 
to the actions of Tuttle. Appellants requested an instruc-
tion based upon their theory that if the deceased were 
traveling south and turned in front of the defendants' 
truck that there should be no recovery, whether or not 
there was an emergency -created thereby even though the 
truck driver could have reasonably anticipated the actions 
of the driver in front and could have avoided the impact 
(defendants' requests No. 8, J.R. 205; No. 9, J.R. 206; No. 
10, J.R. 207). Their theory was correctly submitted to 
the jury by the ·Court, and their requests would have been 
improper if adopted as requested. Of course, since the 
jury believed that the decedent, Dale Tuttle, just prior to 
the collision was traveling north, instruction No. 22 would 
apply to his actions. 
Re insurance indemnification. 
The matter of insurance was first brought out by ap-
pellants on cross-examination (Tr. 90) . It could not in 
any way be prejudicial. The matter, we feel, was fully 
covered in respondents' original brief, pages 32 to 38. Ap-
pellants' statements herein are mere reiteration. The jury 
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would know that the PIE could certainly answer in dam-
ages as well as an insurance company. 
CONCLUSION 
All that respondents ask is that the Court examine 
the evidence as we are sure they will. We ask that they 
look at the testimony \Vhich for some reason or other the 
appellants refer to as negative. Perhaps they mean that 
it negates their fictitious and impossible testimony. Be 
that as it may, the occurrence ,could only have happened 
if the deceased were going north as there is ample evidence 
to show. Again we point out the fact that the only sup-
posed argument the appellants have is that the jury should 
have been instructed to believe the testimony of their wit-
nesses, no matter how impossible and absurd such testi-
mony might have been, no matter how -contrary to the 
physical facts. There is ample evidence to support the ver-
dict of the jury, and their verdict should be upheld. 
We have in no way sought to rely upon sympathy, 
nor did we at any time during the trial. The appellants 
were the ones who talked about sympathy in an effort to 
obtain special consideration from the jury by these tac-
tics. We at no time sought to capitalize on the fact that 
the PIE is a large corporation. Appellants were the 
only ones who have emphasized this fact in an effort to 
get the jury, and now this Court, to sit up so straight that 
they lean over backwards; yet it should not be held against 
the defendants that they are a widow and a minor child, 
nor should it be taken as a matter justifying special con-
sideration to the defendant company that it is a large 
corporation, well able to respond to any judgment that is 
justified by the facts and the law. 
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It would seem against the interests of justice to set 
aside the verdict of the jury so fairly reached, and the fact 
that the jury would not believe the defendants' witnesses 
because of their impossible and improbable testimony 
would seem no reason to so set aside the verdict of the 
jury. The fact that one of the members of this honorable 
Court commented during the oral arguments with respect 
to the large nwnber of requests for instructions, and be-
cause of the fact that the appellants in their purported 
"Reply" Brief have repeatedly adverted to such matter, 
should certainly be no good reason for a reversal of the 
case, nor the proper subject for a Reply Brief. We feel 
confident that the Court will look beyond the general alle-
gations of the appellants to the facts and law of the case 
as brought out by the record, and sustain what without 
question is a fair, well ·considered, and impartial verdict of 
the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. H. CHRISTENSON 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
PIITLLIP V. CHRISTENSON 
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